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1. Introduction
Since the reform process in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries started in the
early 1990s, these countries have begun a transformation into open market economies.
Although the transition has proceeded at different speeds, the change towards private
ownership, deregulation and integration into world markets has been significant in the whole
CEE region (see, e.g., EBRD, 1999).
In the long run, this transformation is likely to not only benefit the relevant countries,
but also the Western European economies. However, there have been some fears that
competition from low-wage countries in the CEE region may have a negative effect on
employment and income distribution in Western Europe, at least in the short run. Although
these fears may be valid for all types of liberalizing low-wage economies, the combination of
geographic proximity, a relatively skilled workforce and preferential trade agreements with
the EU makes the CEE region a stronger potential threat.
One potential source of wage competition is foreign direct investment (FDI), carried
out by multinational enterprises (MNEs) originating in Western Europe. Through FDI, these
firms may combine Western capital, technology and skills with low-cost labor in the host
countries. The stock of inward FDI in the CEE region has grown dramatically in the last ten
years, indicating that many Western firms have indeed chosen to expand in Central and
Eastern Europe. It is important to investigate whether this expansion has affected their
operations in Western Europe and, if so, in what way.
The relationship between an MNE’s expansion in one region and its employment in
other regions is not clear-cut. An expansion in one location may either lead to a contraction
or an expansion of employment in other locations. The direction of the change depends on2
whether the activities in the new location are complements to or substitutes for the activities
in other locations. Thus, not only may an expansion in the CEE region have a positive or
negative effect on employment in the MNE’s other locations, the effect may also vary
between locations. For instance, employment in the parent company in Sweden may increase
as a result of the expansion in CEE, whereas affiliate employment in other low-wage
countries in Europe, such as Portugal and Spain, may decrease.
  The broader question that this paper seeks to address is how FDI in the CEE region
affects labor demand in Western Europe. This question is important in the light of the current
efforts to integrate the CEE countries in the European Union. In this process, low-wage
member countries in Southern Europe have taken a less enthusiastic position than high-wage
countries in Northern Europe. One potential explanation for this difference is that it reflects
different expectations of the effect of a further integration of CEE with Western Europe on
employment and real wages. Arguably, the type of activities that Western European firms
may contemplate locating in the CEE region are activities that would otherwise be located in
other low-wage countries and not those presently located in high-wage countries. However,
whether this is in fact the case has never before been analyzed empirically. Our analysis is
based on data on the foreign activities of Swedish MNEs in the manufacturing sector. Using
these data, we analyze the relationship between firms’ activities in the CEE region and their
employment in other parts of Europe. More specifically, we examine how the increase in
employment in the CEE region has affected the firms’ employment in Sweden as well as in
other European affiliates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present descriptive
evidence on affiliate activities by Swedish MNEs in CEE and other European regions. In this
section, we address the issue of whether the countries in the CEE region seem to be more
similar to the high-wage or low-wage countries in Western Europe in terms of relative factor3
endowments. We also examine whether affiliates in CEE seem to have strong vertical links
with their parent firms. In section 3, we carry out a preliminary analysis of how affiliate
activity in CEE affects employment in other locations, by studying changes in employment in
different regions. In section 4, we estimate econometrically whether affiliate employment in
CEE is more sensitive to labor costs if firms have affiliate activities in other European
locations. We also estimate whether affiliate employment in other European regions is more
sensitive to labor costs if the firms have activities in CEE. This analysis is conducted in order
to address the question whether the possibility of locating affiliates in CEE has led to
increased wage-competition between European regions. Finally, in section 5, we make some
concluding remarks.
2. Inward FDI in Central and Eastern European Economies
2.1 Trends in FDI in Central and Eastern Europe
Since the opening up of CEE, FDI in the region has increased dramatically. Table 1 shows
the development of inward FDI stocks per capita between 1990 and 1998 in the world as well
as for three European regions: Southern Europe, defined as Greece, Portugal, Spain and
Turkey, Western Europe, defined as all remaining EU countries plus Norway and
Switzerland, and CEE.
1 In CEE, the inward stock of FDI increased ten-fold, while it roughly
doubled in the other regions. However, the average inward FDI stock per capita is still
considerably lower in CEE than in the other European regions. As is shown by Table 1, the
inward FDI stock per capita in Southern Europe has grown relatively slowly during the4
period that inward FDI emerges in CEE. The figures for the entire CEE region, however,
mask considerable variation among these countries. Hungary and the Czech Republic have
reached levels of inward FDI stock per capita in parity with the ones for Western and
Southern Europe.  Furthermore, when related to GDP, the inward FDI stock of the CEE
region is comparable to those of Southern and Western Europe.
2
Table 1 about here
A more accurate picture of the MNEs’ activities is given by activity data, i.e., data on
employment, production and sales by firms. In this study, we use data on the Swedish MNEs’
foreign activities collected by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) in
Stockholm.
3 These data give information about the location of producing affiliates of
Swedish manufacturing firms and the types of activities carried out.
Tables 2a-c present aggregate information on the surveyed firms’ activities in different
regions. As can be seen from these tables, the firm-level data exhibit a similar pattern as the
FDI data above. Whereas affiliate activity in CEE was virtually non-existent in 1990, in
1998, employment in CEE constituted 5 percent of the firms’ total European employment.
4
At the same time, the share of both Western and Southern European employment decreased,
while the share of parent employment in Sweden increased. Thus, by 1998, CEE was a small,
but significant, host region of Swedish MNEs, and their operations in the region roughly
corresponded to the CEE share of total European GDP (which was 5.8 percent). As revealed
                                                                                                                                                       
1 Central and Eastern Europe include Albania, Bosnia & Hercegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,  Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Yugoslavia.
2 In 1998, the inward FDI stock as a share of GDP was 12 percent in CEE, while it was 17 percent in both
Southern and Western Europe (World Bank, 2000).
3 This database is described in Braunerhjelm and Ekholm (1998). An account of the results from the latest
survey for 1998 is found in Ekholm and Hesselman (2000).
4This corresponds to 13 percent of their total affiliate employment in Europe.5
by Table 2b, however, the share of activities located in CEE was much smaller when
measured in terms of sales. This suggests that the labor productivity of affiliates located in
CEE is, on average, lower than that of  affiliates located in other European regions.
Tables 2a-c about here
The aggregate picture thus suggests that substitution has taken place between the CEE region
and other European regions. However, a further look at firm-level behavior is crucial to
substantiate such a claim. The correlation between employment in the different regions may
be due to other factors. For instance, the sample of MNEs changed substantially between
1990 and 1998. If the firms that left the sample were less active in CEE than the new entrants,
the change in the geographical pattern of production may simply be due to firm or industry
characteristics. Consequently, to examine whether Swedish firms have actually relocated
production from one region to another, we have to analyze firm-level data, which is done in
section 3. However, before entering into the firm-level analysis, we shall examine some
descriptive evidence based on these firm-level data.
2.2 Affiliate Activities in Central and Eastern Europe
The literature on FDI usually distinguishes between two different types of FDI; horizontal
and vertical.
5 Whether we would expect the expansion of activities in one location to
substitute for or be complementary to activities in other locations crucially depends on
whether FDI is of the horizontal or vertical type. According to the theory of horizontal FDI,
                                                
5 See e.g. Markusen (1984), Horstman and Markusen (1992), and Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) for
analyses of horizontal FDI. See Helpman (1984) for an early analysis of vertical FDI.6
firms invest abroad in order to avoid trade costs associated with exporting from the home
plant to export markets. Consequently, the (potential) MNE weighs the trade costs associated
with exporting against the additional costs associated with setting up a new plant abroad.
Horizontal FDI in a former export market therefore has a negative impact on domestic
employment as domestic production for exports is supplanted by local production in the host
country. So-called export platform FDI, meaning investment in affiliate production exported
to a third market, is closely related to horizontal FDI.
6 The employment effects for the home
country are less clear in this case. With platform FDI, employment in the affiliate may
substitute for affiliate production in the third market, rather than in the home country.
According to the theory of vertical FDI, firms invest abroad to reduce overall
production costs, benefiting from factor-price differentials between countries. For instance,
the MNE may locate skill-intensive activities in relatively skill-abundant countries and less
skill-intensive activities in relatively unskilled-labor abundant countries. According to this
theory, the firm’s trade-off amounts to weighing the trade costs associated with fragmenting
production across locations against the gains from reducing factor input costs by locating
stages with different factor intensities in countries with different factor prices. In this setting,
an expansion abroad is less likely to have a negative impact on domestic employment, as
lower total production costs due to vertical FDI are likely to make the firm more competitive,
thereby enabling an expansion of total employment within the MNE.
According to the theory of horizontal FDI, a large l ocal market and high trade costs
would lead to a high level of affiliate production. According to the theory of vertical FDI, on
the other hand, low trade costs and large factor-cost differences would lead to a high level of
affiliate production (Markusen, 1997, Carr et al., 2001, Markusen and Maskus, 2001).
Investment costs and other set-up costs should have a negative effect on all types of affiliate
                                                
6 An example of this is US FDI in Ireland in order to produce for the EU market.7
production. Thus, we would expect stronger vertical linkages, and a complementary
relationship, between two locations when trade costs are low and factor cost differences
large. Locations with similar factor costs are more likely to attract the same type of activities
and we would therefore expect a relationship of substitution between such locations.
7
Based on theory, we would thus find it more likely that affiliate employment in two
different host countries are complementary if their respective activities differ in terms of
factor-intensity Furthermore, if the units are vertically linked through intra-firm trade, we
would also find them more likely to be complementary. Thus, in order to assess how the
activities located in different European regions may be affected by the expansion in CEE, it is
important to investigate the extent of similarity in factor-intensity between units and the
extent of vertical links. In this section, we shall use descriptive evidence to address the
following two questions: (i) Is the CEE region more similar to Western or Southern Europe
with respect to its relative endowments of skilled labor? (ii) Are affiliate sales in CEE mainly
destined for the local or foreign markets? (iii) Are affiliate activities in CEE vertically linked
to parent activities?
Table 3 about here
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the Swedish MNEs’ activities across
European regions in 1998. The first row shows the average level of wage costs paid by
Swedish MNEs in different European locations. For the CEE region, the average wage costs
per employee were considerably lower than in the other European regions. They were 19
                                                
7 See Braconier & Ekholm (2000a, 2000b) for a more thorough discussion on the relationship between
employment in different locations of MNEs.8
percent of the wage costs in Southern Europe, and 13 and 12 percent of the wage costs in
Sweden and Western Europe, respectively.
8
Given the low wage costs in CEE, firms would be expected to have a strong incentive
to locate labor-intensive activities in this area. However, to a large extent, low wages are just
a reflection of low average labor productivity. For an MNE, the profitability of locating
production abroad depends on the productivity-adjusted labor costs or, put differently, the
MNEs’ ability to combine its technology and skills with low labor costs to increase
productivity. The second row of Table 3 shows the value added per employee as a measure of
labor productivity. There are two important caveats that must be kept in mind when
interpreting these figures. First, differences in tax treatment of capital income may induce
firms to use transfer pricing to shift profits between locations, which will affect measured
value-added (Clausing, 1998). Second, measured productivity will tend to be lower in
Swedish parents, since the firms typically incur most of their costs for producing headquarter
services (such as R&D and management) in the home country. Still, it is evident that labor
productivity is much lower in CEE than in any other region. Based on the figures for value
added per employee, the average labor productivity in affiliates located in Southern Europe is
five times higher than in the ones in CEE. Consequently, the low wage costs mirror the low
average labor productivity in the region.
One obvious reason for differences in average wage costs across regions is differences
in the skill composition of the labor force. In other words, the low average wage in CEE may
reflect a scarcity of skilled labor. If this were the case, we would expect MNEs to mainly
locate activities requiring large amounts of unskilled labor in the region. Conceivably, we
would then also mainly expect affiliate activities in Southern European countries to
                                                
8 However, it should be noted that there are significant differences in wage costs across the CEE region. While
the OECD (2000) reports wage costs in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary that are roughly 25 percent of9
contractas a result of an expansion in the CEE region. . In many of the CEE countries,
however, a fairly large share of the labor force has a post-secondary education.
9 In this
respect, they appear to be fairly abundant in skilled workers. Arguably, the skills these
workers acquired during the communist era may not be of much value in a market economy.
Be that as it may, if the CEE countries develop comparative advantages in skill-intensive
activities on account of their relatively highly educated labor force,
 we would expect MNEs
to locate skill-intensive activities in the region. In that case, a contraction of activities in the
skill-abundant countries in Western Europe would be a more likely result.
The descriptive evidence presented in Table 3 helps us address the issue of whether
skill endowments and skill-intensities found in CEE are more similar to the ones found in
Western or Southern Europe. The third row shows the ratio of wage costs per employee for
white-collar and blue-collar workers employed by Swedish MNEs. The ratios are
substantially lower in Sweden and Western Europe compared to Southern Europe and CEE.
This suggests that skilled labor is relatively scarcer in the latter two regions (at least insofar
as the distinction between white-collar and blue-collar workers captures differences in levels
of skills).
10
The next row in Table 3 gives information about the skill-intensity of activities located
in different regions by Swedish MNEs. More specifically, it shows the ratio between white-
collar and blue-collar workers. Whereas this ratio is as high as two-thirds for Swedish
parents, it is 0.48 in Western Europe, 0.21 in Southern Europe and 0.29 in CEE. Thus, the
firms do seem to respond to differences in relative wages by locating white-collar worker
                                                                                                                                                       
the wage costs within the EU, WIIW (1999) reports that wage rates in a country such as Romania are only about
25 percent of the ones found in the richer CEE countries.
9 See e.g. the Barro-Lee dataset.
10  Similar conclusions can be drawn from a survey of wages for engineers relative to production workers made
by Union Bank of Switzerland (2001). The relative wage between these two groups was 1.34 for Sweden, 1.87
for CEE, 1.58 for Western Europe and 2.10 for Southern Europe. For the CEE region, data were only available10
intensive activities to Sweden and other Western European countries and blue-collar worker
intensive activities to Southern Europe and CEE.
11
Another potential indicator of the skill-intensity of activities located in different regions
is the R&D intensity. The fifth row in Table 3 shows R&D expenditures as a share of total
sales. It is evident that R&D spending constitutes a much higher share of total sales for
Swedish parents than for affiliates. However, among the affiliates, CEE and Southern Europe
have a fairly similar R&D intensity, while it is somewhat higher for Western Europe.
Another important question is to what extent MNE production in CEE is oriented
towards production for the local market or for export markets. Empirically, the size of the
host country market has been shown to be one of the most important determinants of FDI
(e.g. Brainard, 1997, Carr et al., 2001). Even though the population of CEE constitutes a
fairly large share of the total European population (35 percent in 1998), low incomes and
productivity imply that its share of total European GDP is much lower (around 6 percent at
current exchange rates).
12 The individual national markets in CEE are very small, the only
potential exceptions being the Russian Federation and Poland. However, their GDPs are still
only comparable to a small Western European country such as Sweden (whose share in total
European GDP was about 2 percent in 1998). It is likely that the fairly small markets in CEE
make market-oriented (horizontal) FDI less important than for the Western and Southern
European regions. Accordingly, good access to export markets is likely to be more important
for MNEs investing in CEE than for those investing in large Western European countries.
Through membership in the WTO and EFTA, most CEE countries have obtained access to
                                                                                                                                                       
for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia. Data for Russia were not included in the analysis, as
engineering wages were substantially lower than wages for manual workers there.
11 A likely explanation for the higher wage ratio between white-collar and blue-collar workers (and the larger
share of white collar workers in employment) in Sweden than in Western Europe is the concentration of skill-
intensive headquarter services such as management and R&D in the home country.
12 World Bank (2001) and OECD Economic Outlook 68 (2001).11
large export markets. As shown in the fifth row of Table 3, exports to sales ratios are indeed
higher for CEE than for Western and Southern Europe in 1998.
The combination of relatively good access to foreign markets and large factor cost
differences vis-à-vis other European regions means that we also expect affiliates located in
CEE to be more vertically integrated with other parts of the MNE. Therefore, we would
expect to observe substantial intra-firm trade for affiliates located in CEE. The data give a
less clear picture of this, however. Although the figures on total exports might indicate a high
degree of vertical integration, where affiliates located in CEE export to other affiliates, this
cannot be separated out from the data. With respect to sales back to Swedish parents (row
seven in Table 3), CEE exports are in line with those from affiliates located in Southern
Europe, but lower than exports from affiliates in Western Europe. Consequently, the evidence
of Swedish MNEs using CEE as a location for upstream production is weak.
Regarding imports, we find much stronger evidence of vertical integration of the
affiliates located in CEE (rows eight and nine in Table 3). Again, our data do not allow us to
separate out imports from other affiliates. However, the data on imports from Swedish
parents show that total imports from Swedish parents amount to 16 percent of total affiliates
sales for CEE, while the corresponding figures are 15 and 3 percent for Western and Southern
Europe, respectively. Moreover, virtually all imports to affiliates located in CEE consist of
intermediate inputs, whereas intermediates only account for approximately 65 to 75 percent
of total imports for the other regions. Another interesting fact emerging from the data is that
while the share of imports of intermediate inputs in total affiliate sales has increased
substantially for CEE (from 0 to 16 percent between 1990 and 1998), there has been a
successive decline in this share for Southern Europe (from 9 to 2 percent between 1990 and
1998). This may be an indication that the MNEs have moved downstream activities from
Southern Europe to CEE. All in all, the descriptive evidence suggests that affiliates located in12
CEE are vertically integrated with their parents as downstream, rather than upstream,
producers.
13
Another important factor determining the pattern of FDI, which is closely related to
trade costs, is the geographical proximity to potential markets and/or home countries of
MNEs (e.g. Shatz and Venables, 2000). The CEE countries closest to the core of the
European Union, i.e. Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Baltic states, have attracted
more inward FDI than more peripheral countries. The concentration of FDI in these countries
does not in itself confirm the importance of geographical proximity, as these countries have
also been the most successful in transforming their economies (e.g. in carrying out
institutional reform and trade liberalization). However, simple eyeballing suggests that MNEs
from a particular EU country tend to establish affiliates in nearby CEE countries. For
example, out of the total affiliate employment located in CEE by Swedish MNEs in 1998, 35
percent were located in the nearby Baltic countries, whereas only 4 percent were located in
the Czech Republic. In comparison, the total inward FDI stock in the Czech Republic is four
times as large as the stock in the Baltic countries (WDI, 1999).
To summarize, Swedish MNEs primarily seem to have located fairly low-skill intensive
activities in CEE up until 1998. These activities appear to be more export oriented than
affiliate activities in Western and Southern Europe. Furthermore, affiliates in CEE seem to
have a relatively high propensity to import intermediate inputs from their Swedish parents.
Altogether, this suggests that the affiliate activities located in CEE might be characterized as
export platform FDI, where downstream production is carried out with relatively unskilled-
labor intensive techniques. The evidence of specialization in relatively unskilled-labor
intensive production suggests that the least skill-abundant of the other European regions (i.e.
                                                
13 One potential explanation is that upstream production seems to be more skill-intensive than downstream
production (cf. Venables, 1999).13
Southern Europe) is the region most likely to be hurt by the expansion of MNE activity in
CEE.
3. Employment Effects of Affiliate Activity in CEE
We now turn to analyzing the effect of affiliate activities in CEE on employment in other
parts of the MNEs. More specifically, we address the following questions: (i) Has the
expansion of affiliate activity led to a decrease in employment in other European locations?
(ii) If so, has the effect been strongest in Sweden, Western Europe or Southern Europe?
First, we look at how the probability of firms expanding (and setting up) production in
CEE relates to the MNEs production structure. Out of 252 observations of active MNEs in
1990 and 1994, 29 expanded their affiliate activity in CEE in the following periods, 1990-
1994 and 1994-1998. Consequently, for 11.5 percent of the observations, firms expanded
their production in CEE. If starting from the 207 MNE observations with affiliate activities in
Western Europe in 1990 and 1994, we find that 25 of these (12.1 percent) expanded in CEE.
Finally, we have 42 observations on MNEs with affiliate activities in Southern Europe in
1990 and 1994. Ten of these (23.8 percent) expanded their activities in CEE in the next time
period. Thus, MNEs with activities in Southern Europe were more likely to establish
production in CEE than other MNEs.
A related issue is whether an expansion in CEE has an impact on employment patterns
in other locations where the MNE operates. In Table 4, we report the average changes in
employment in different locations according to whether the firms have expanded in the CEE
region. As shown by this table, average employment in all non-CEE locations decreased over
the period studied. The first column reports changes in employment in Sweden for MNEs14
with any affiliate employment in Europe 1990-1998, distinguishing between firms that
expanded in the CEE region and those that did not. On average, firms expanding in CEE
reduced their employment in Sweden by about five times more (-1103/-216) than the others .
Similar effects are found for affiliate employment in Western and Southern Europe (which
decreased another four and five times, respectively, for MNEs expanding in the CEE region).
Consequently, the expansion in CEE is negatively correlated with changes in employment in
other parts of Europe. As shown in Table 4, the difference in employment reduction for firms
that expanded in CEE and those that did not is significant for Sweden and Southern Europe,
but not for Western Europe.
Table 4 about here
What is important from Table 4 is not only the difference between firms that expanded
in CEE and those that did not, but also the relative impact on the three European regions. The
total reduction in employment in Sweden, Western Europe and Southern Europe 1990-1998
by firms expanding in CEE was around 50 000. By comparing each region’s share of this
employment reduction with its share of MNE employment in 1990, we get a measure of the
exposure to relocation due to an expansion in CEE. As shown in the lower part of Table 4, an
employee in Southern Europe was three times as likely to be replaced by workers in CEE as a
Swedish employee and six times as likely as a Western European employee. Clearly,
Southern Europe has thus been most strongly affected by the expansion of employment in
CEE.
14
                                                
14 This ranking is also confirmed when we correlate employment changes in CEE and Southern Europe, Western
Europe and Sweden. The simple correlations are –0.67, -0.47 and –0.26, respectively.15
It may be noted that the size of the employment expansion by Swedish MNEs in CEE
1990-1998 is much smaller than their employment contraction in the rest of Europe. Thus, the
employment reduction cannot solely be attributed to a relocation of activities within Europe.
Naturally, there may be many other reasons why there is an overall decrease in these firms’
employment in Western and Southern Europe, such as a changing firm sample and a bias
towards firms operating in declining industries. Here, we have not controlled for any such
factors.
One way of finding the importance of changes in the firm sample and the industry
composition of firms is to make a decomposition of the total change in the CEE region’s
share of MNE employment. We define the CEE share of affiliate employment in low-wage
countries in Europe (taken to consist of Southern Europe and CEE) as:
￿ =
i it it t es ES q ,    (1)
where  i q  is firm i’s share of employment in low-wage countries in Europe and  i es  the share
of firm i’s employment in the CEE region. In order to analyze changes in employment shares
in the CEE-region, we follow Bailey et al. (1992) and make the decomposition:
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ˛ ˛ ˛ ˛ - - - - + D + D = D
S i S i N i X i k it k it it it is it i k it t es es es es ES q q q q , (2)
where S is the set of firms included in the sample for two consecutive years, N is the set of
entrants between t and t-1 and X is the set of exiting firms between t and t-1. The first term on
the right hand side shows the “within” effect, which is the contribution by changes in the
individual firm’s CEE share of employment, holding its share of total employment in low-16
wage European countries constant. The second term shows the “between” effect, which is the
contribution of changes in firms’ employment shares, holding the CEE share of their
employment constant. The last two terms show the contribution of entry and exit into the
sample, where a positive effect would indicate that entrants are more involved in the CEE
region than exiting firms.
15 The results from this decomposition are showed in Table 5, which
also shows the results from a similar decomposition of changes in the CEE share of total
European affiliate employment.
Table 5 about here
The CEE share of total affiliate employment in low-wage European countries increased
from less than 5 percent to 75 percent between 1990 and 1998. For the period 1990-1994, the
“within” effect explained 62 percent of the change in the CEE share, while the “between”
effect explained 50 percent and net entry –11 percent. Consequently, the main part of the
expansion in the CEE share is due to firms that have increased the share of employment
located in CEE. This is fairly clear evidence of substitution between CEE and Southern
Europe. Furthermore, the large “between” effect implies that firms expanding in terms of
their shares of affiliate employment in low-wage countries in Europe were also the ones with
a relatively large share of their employment in the CEE region. Finally, a negative effect from
net entry implies that entrants tended to be less involved in the CEE region than exiting firms.
For the period 1994-1998, the “between” effect dominates completely, whereas the
“within” effect is small and net entry has a large negative effect. Consequently, the within-
firm shift towards the CEE region seems to be much smaller, while the firms already having a
                                                
15 Changes in the sample may occur for two different reasons. Firms may enter or exit the IUI database of
Swedish MNEs or they may enter or exit the sub-sample of firms with activities in low-wage countries in
Europe.17
relatively large share of their employment in the CEE region seem to have expanded their
employment shares in low-wage countries in Europe substantially. Altogether, we thus see a
large within-firm shift towards the CEE region in the period 1990-1994 and a large relative
expansion of firms with a relatively large share of their operations in CEE in 1994-1998. As
can be seen from the lower part of Table 6, the same overall pattern emerges for the
decomposition of the change in the CEE region’s share of total European affiliate
employment.
4. Cross-wage Elasticities and Wage Competition
According to the evidence presented so far, the expansion of affiliate activities in CEE has
been associated with a contraction of employment in the rest of Europe. This contraction has
been most pronounced for low-wage countries in Southern Europe. The question is then
whether this apparent relocation of production is due to wage competition between locations.
The substitution of employment in one region for employment in another is not necessarily
the result of the firms’ efforts to minimize wage-costs. One might, for example, argue that
Swedish MNEs have relocated affiliate activities in CEE to take advantage of unique assets
or better locations. Moreover, even if the substitution of employment between regions is
caused by the firms’ desire to reduce labor costs, this does not necessarily lead to increased
wage-competition between the regions. For instance, it could very well be that wages are so
much lower in CEE than in the other European regions that no realistic reduction of wages
would make affiliate production in those regions more profitable than in CEE. If that were the
case, labor cost differentials would explain the relocation of production, but no wage
competition would actually take place. Hence, from a policy perspective, it is important to18
examine to what extent firms respond to changes in labor cost differentials between regions
by changing the regional structure of employment. This is the task undertaken in this section.
It is not only the type of FDI that may affect the relationship between employment in
different locations. As Braconier and Ekholm (2000b) show, two locations may be
alternatives for a specific investment project, but once the choice of location has been made,
marginal changes in employment in one location may very well be complementary to
employment in the other. The reason for this is that setting up production is associated with
fixed costs. Once the MNE has decided on the location pattern of its activities, relocation of
production units between countries becomes costly.
Braconier and Ekholm (2000b) find that, empirically, the distinction between the
decision whether to locate affiliate production in a particular host country and the decision to
change the level of employment in existing affiliates is an important one. More specifically,
they find that relative labor costs do not affect the level of employment in existing affiliates
to any great extent, although they have a significant impact on the probability that a MNE
will operate in a particular host country.
In our analysis, we attempt to capture these two aspects of potential wage competition.
First, labor cost differentials may affect the distribution of employment across a given set of
affiliates. Estimating labor demand functions within firms, which would give us estimates of
cross-wage elasticities showing the effect on employment in one location of changes in labor
costs in another, would capture these effects (e.g., Slaughter 1995, Brainard and Riker 1997a,
1997b, Braconier and Ekholm, 2000a). Furthermore, changes in labor cost differentials may
affect the distribution of locations where the firm decides to operate. Put differently, labor
cost differentials may affect the firm’s choice of location for setting up a new plant (in
addition to the decision to hire or fire workers in existing plants). Previous studies suggest
that wage-competition between locations is much stronger at this stage of the firm’s decision19
making than when deciding on the level of employment in existing affiliates (e.g., Braconier
and Ekholm, 2000b).
In order to capture the effect of wage-competition in the firms’ choice of location for
their affiliates, we estimate a selection model where the probability of observing affiliate
activities in a particular host country is assumed to depend on labor costs and local market
size. We estimate the following equation:
( ) ( )
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where  ijt A  is a dichotomous variable denoting whether firm i has affiliate activities in country
j at time t. The w’s are labor cost variables; 
O w  denoting local labor costs in country j and
S w  denoting labor costs in Sweden. 
o w d ·  is an interaction variable, interacting local labor
costs with a dummy variable (d) taking the value one if firm i currently has affiliate activities
in a certain region and the value zero if it has not. This variable is our main variable of
interest and its interpretation will be explained shortly. 
O D  denotes local market size and is
included to control for the effect of market size on the attractiveness of a certain location as a
host country of affiliate activities. The variable 
O y  denotes average labor productivity in
country j and is included to control for the effect of productivity differences on labor cost
differences.
From a theoretical point of view and on basis of results from previous studies, we
would expect that labor costs in other locations than the host and home countries may have an
impact on the firm’s decision to give affiliate activities a particular location. That is, labor
costs in other potential locations for affiliate activities – locations where the firm already
operates or entirely new locations – may be of importance (see, e.g., Brainard and Riker,20
1997a, 1997b, Braconier and Ekholm, 2000a, 2000b). However, our sample is too small to
include any additional labor costs variables in the model.
16
Labor costs in Sweden are measured by industry-distributed average labor costs in
Swedish manufacturing.
17 Ideally, we would also like to have exogenous labor cost data for
the host countries, but finding such data is difficult. The local labor cost w
0 is therefore
calculated from information on labor costs in the database on Swedish MNEs. More
specifically, w
0 is the average labor cost in all affiliates of all firms in the sample, except firm
i, that are located in country j. The market size variable 
O D  is measured as GDP and 
O y  as
GDP per capita.
18
We expect that local labor costs will have a negative effect on the probability of a firm
producing in a particular location, while we expect market size and average labor
productivity to have positive effects. We have no strong prior on the effect of labor costs in
Sweden, since increased labor costs in the home country may lead to an expansion or a
contraction of affiliate activities, depending on the nature of the affiliate activities. We would
expect the former effect if firms tend to relocate activities to country j when labor costs rise
in the home country, and the latter effect if the reduced profitability tended to lead to a
contraction of the overall activities of the firm.
Our variable of main interest will serve the purpose of capturing any additional
sensitivity to local labor costs stemming from the geographical structure of the firm. For
instance, we may estimate the model in (3) for CEE countries only and let the dummy
variable d take the value one for all firms which also have affiliate activities in Southern
Europe. In this case, the interaction variable captures any difference in sensitivity to local
                                                
16 In the studies that have been conducted on Swedish data, labor costs in locations where the firm already
operates (measured as employment-weighted indices) do not have significant effects (Braconier and Ekholm,
2000a).
17 Wage data have been collected from Industristatistiken (Statistics Sweden) and data on payroll taxes have
been supplied by the Swedish Employer's Confederation.21
wage costs between firms with and without affiliate activities in Southern Europe. We may
also estimate the model for Western or Southern European countries only and let the dummy
variable indicate whether the firm has affiliate activities in CEE. Once more, the interaction
variable will capture any difference in the response to local labor costs between firms with
and without affiliate activity in CEE. If an expansion in CEE leads to stronger wage-
competition between locations, we would, in this case, expect 
o w d ·  to have a negative
impact on the probability of observing affiliate activity in country j. This would imply that if
a firm sets up activities in CEE, the survival of affiliates in other locations becomes more
sensitive to local labor costs.
The effect of wage-competition on the level of employment in existing plants is
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where Lijt is firm i’s employment in country j at time t. One difference compared to equation
(3) is that all coefficients may now be interpreted as elasticities.
19 Equations (3) and (4) are
estimated with the Heckman method to account for potential selection bias problems.
20 Time
dummies have been included in both (3) and (4). An important role of the time dummies is to
capture changes in the overall price level. All labor cost variables included in the analysis
have been constructed from data reporting costs in current Swedish Kronor (SEK). Moreover,
we have converted GDP figures to SEK using current exchange rates. The time dummies will
                                                                                                                                                       
18 Data have been collected from World Development Indicator (World Bank, 2000).
19 We also tried to introduce the interaction effect in the labor demand function, but in none of the cases
discussed below did this effect come through as significant.
20 In the Heckman estimations, we have used the cluster-option in the STATA package to re-estimate standard
errors with potential dependence within MNEs. In principle, the selection model could be estimated with a
fixed-effect logit estimation, but this is not a viable option, due to low degrees of freedom in most estimations.22
thus control for changes in the variables due to a general rise in the price level. In the case of
the base specifications, however, we must exclude the time dummies in the wage equations to
be able to estimate the model, since otherwise, we would have the same variables in the
selection equation and the labor demand equation.
First, we investigate whether the effect of local labor costs (the own-wage effect) for
affiliates located in CEE is related to whether the MNE has affiliates in Western and
Southern Europe. If the elasticity is significantly greater for affiliates in a certain region (i.e.
if 
o w d · is positive and significant), CEE affiliates are exposed to stronger than average
wage-competition with this region. The results are presented in Table 6. Column 1 is our base
regression, where the coefficients reported for the selection model show that the likelihood of
observing affiliate activity in country j is decreasing in the local labor cost and increasing in
local market size and labor costs in Sweden. Except for our proxy for labor productivity, all
estimated coefficients have the expected sign, although none of them are significant at
standard levels of significance. The positive estimate for Swedish labor costs indicates a
relationship of substitution between employment in Swedish parents and affiliates in CEE,
since it implies that higher labor costs in Sweden increase the probability of observing
affiliate activities in CEE.
The reported elasticities in Table 6 are the elasticities of the probability of observing
affiliate activity in host country j, with respect to the independent variables, computed at the
mean of observations on the independent variable. According to our estimates, a one percent
increase in local labor costs decreases the probability of observing affiliate activity by 1.25
percent.
In the estimated labor demand equation, all coefficients have the expected signs but,
once more, none of them are significant at standard levels of significance. The result for the
so-called Heckman’s lambda shows no evidence of a selection bias problem.23
Our base regression does neither explain the probability of observing affiliate activities
in a specific CEE country very well, nor the level of employment in these affiliates. This
probably relates both to the fact that we only have a small sample of actual affiliate activity
and the fact that we have controlled for no institutional aspects, e.g. differences in the extent
of investment liberalization, that may be of considerable importance.
21
In the second column of Table 6, we include the interaction variable and let the dummy
variable indicate whether firms have affiliate activity in Western Europe. The estimated
coefficient thus indicates whether the probability of observing affiliate activities in CEE is
more sensitive to local labor costs in CEE for firms with affiliates in Western Europe. The
estimated coefficient is negative and highly significant. All other effects are similar to the
base specification.
In the last column, we present results from a similar specification, only here the dummy
variable indicates whether firms have affiliates in Southern Europe. In this specification, the
estimated overall effect of local labor costs is virtually zero, but for firms with affiliates in
Southern Europe, the effect is highly significant. Thus, local labor costs in CEE are important
if the MNE has affiliates in Southern Europe. As in the case of Western Europe, this suggests
wage competition between the regions. Now, the estimated coefficient for Swedish labor
costs is highly significant. All other estimates are similar to the other specifications, with the
exception of Heckman’s lambda, which is now significant. The overall fit is also much better
than in the previous two estimations, as shown by the log likelihood.
All in all, the results in Table 6 suggest that Swedish MNEs’ decisions to locate
production in CEE are influenced by local wage costs if the firm already has activities in
Western or Southern Europe. The increased sensitivity to local labor costs is strongest for
                                                
21 There are no data on such factors that cover the whole time period, which is why they are not included in the
regressions.24
firms with activities in Southern Europe. For these firms, the own-wage elasticity is increased
by 0.38, while the corresponding increase is 0.17 for firms with affiliates in Western Europe.
Labor costs in Sweden also seem to affect the decision to locate in CEE. The estimated
elasticity of 2.12 in the last specification is large and significant. We interpret this as
evidence of locations in CEE being engaged in wage-competition with other European
locations for MNE activity. Furthermore, the insignificance of the estimated coefficients of
local market size emphasizes our earlier conclusion that affiliate activity in CEE seems to be
strongly export oriented.
  Table 7 shows the results from similar estimations, using a sample only including host
countries in Southern Europe. The estimated coefficients presented in the first column have
the expected signs and the local market size is significant in the selection equation, while the
results for the labor demand equation are generally poor. In the second column, we add the
interaction variable, letting the dummy variable indicate whether firms have affiliate
activities in CEE. In this case, the overall own-wage effect is still insignificant and small,
while the additional effect for firms with affiliate activity in CEE is negative and significant
at the five-percent level. Consequently, Southern European affiliates seem to be more
vulnerable to labor cost increases, if the MNE has activities in CEE. The interaction effect
also improves the overall fit of the estimation and produces a much more reasonable labor
demand equation.
22 In the third and fourth columns, we investigate whether the additional
sensitivity to local labor costs found for firms with affiliates in CEE is systematically
different for labor-intensive (LI) and R&D-intensive high-tech (HT) industries.
23 We would
                                                
22 One alternative interpretation of the results in the second column is that they reflect a general increase in the
wage-sensitivity of FDI over time as FDI has been increasingly liberalized. For instance, Hatzius (2000) has
shown that increased FDI has tended to make labor demand in the UK and Germany more elastic. Since affiliate
activity in CEE has also increased over time, the results might be explained by general FDI liberalization.
However, we find no evidence of increasing wage-sensitivity over time in our data when allowing for time-
specific own-wage elasticities (the results from these estimations are available from the authors upon request).
23 We follow Dollar & Wolff (1993) when defining industries as labor intensive or high-tech.25
expect firms operating in labor-intensive industries to be particularly sensitive to labor cost
differentials, while the opposite would be expected for firms operating in high-tech
industries. The results reported in table 7 confirm that firms operating in labor-intensive
industries seem to be more sensitive to local labor costs, while firms operating in high-tech
industries seem to be less sensitive to local labor costs.
In Table 8, we show the results of similar estimations for Western European affiliates.
Here, the results for the selection equation are much better than the ones presented in Tables
6 and 7. The coefficients have the expected signs and are generally significant at the five-
percent level. As in the previous tables, however, the results for the labor demand equation
are somewhat mixed.
The main result from the selection model is that now, we find no significant effect of
the interaction between local labor costs and the dummy indicating whether the firm has
affiliate activity in CEE. Thus, affiliate activities in CEE do not seem to make these firms
more sensitive to local labor costs. Furthermore, we now find fairly strong evidence of
substitution between employment in Western European affiliates and Swedish parents. The
estimated coefficients are positive and significant at the five-percent level in all
specifications. Furthermore, the computed elasticities suggest that a one percent increase in
labor costs in Sweden increases the probability of observing affiliate activity in a Western
European host country by 1.6-1.7 percent. In this sub-sample, we find no evidence that firms
operating in labor-intensive or high-tech industries differ from other firms in terms of their
sensitivity to local labor costs.
To conclude the results from the econometric analysis, we find evidence of firms with
affiliate activities in CEE and Southern Europe being particularly sensitive to local labor
costs in both regions. In this sense, affiliates in CEE and Southern Europe seem to be exposed
to wage-competition vis-à-vis each other. The evidence on wage-competition between CEE26
and Western Europe is much weaker. We also find some evidence suggesting that the cross-
wage effect with respect to the home country, Sweden, is positive, which indicates that
employees in affiliates in CEE and employees in Swedish parents, on average, tend to be
substitutes. All in all, the results support the notion that the expansion of Western European
firms in the CEE region may contribute to stronger wage-competition within Europe. They
also support the idea that in particular the low-wage countries in Southern Europe are
affected.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have examined the recent expansion of FDI into Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) and its consequences for employment in other European regions. By using firm level
data on Swedish MNEs, we have compared affiliates located in CEE with other European
affiliates. We have found that, on average, affiliates in CEE exhibit lower labor productivity,
lower labor costs and smaller shares of skilled labor than their counterparts in the rest of
Europe. Furthermore, they tend to have larger export shares and lower R&D intensity than
other European affiliates. Finally, their pattern of intra-firm trade suggests that they are more
likely to be engaged in downstream activities (e.g. assembly) than other European affiliates.
The fact that affiliates in CEE seem to be fairly low-skill intensive suggests that the
activities conducted in CEE are more similar to those conducted in the low-wage countries in
Southern Europe than in the high-wage countries in Western Europe. Consequently, we
would expect Southern Europe to be especially vulnerable to the emergence of affiliate
activities in CEE. This is confirmed by our results, which show that the reduction in
employment related to the firms’ expansion in CEE has been considerably larger in Southern27
European affiliates than in Western European affiliates or Swedish parents. This shift from
Southern Europe to CEE seems to a large extent have taken place within MNEs, at least in
the period 1990-1994. That is, firms seem to have increased affiliate employment in CEE
while they have decreased affiliate employment in Southern Europe.
In the last section of the paper, we have estimated a model explaining demand for labor
in a particular host country by local labor costs and market size. We use this model as a
starting point for addressing the issue of whether the apparent substitution of production in
CEE for production in other parts of Europe have led to increased wage-competition within
Europe. We examine whether the sensitivity to labor costs in CEE is stronger for firms with
affiliate activities in other European countries and whether the sensitivity to labor costs in
other European countries is stronger for firms with affiliate activities in CEE. The results
suggest that affiliate employment in Southern Europe is more sensitive to local labor costs if
the firm also has affiliate activities in CEE and vice versa. We interpret this as evidence of
Southern European employees facing increased wage-competition as a result of the expansion
in CEE. The evidence of increased wage-competition for Western European employees is
much weaker. However, our results indicate that there is an element of wage competition
between affiliate employment in CEE and employment in Swedish parents.
It is tempting to use the results of this study to draw conclusions about how the
integration of CEE into the rest of Europe is likely to have affected European labor markets
and to discuss the likely effects of an Eastern enlargement of the EU. On basis of our results,
we would expect the adjustment costs associated with a relocation of economic activity from
current EU members towards CEE to fall disproportionately on the low-wage countries in
Southern EU. However, it should be kept in mind that the conclusions drawn in this study are
based on a sample of Swedish manufacturing firms with production activities abroad. To be
able to generalize the results based on this firm sample, we would have to know to what28
extent the sample is representative for other European MNEs. However, we have no
information that enables us to address this issue. Therefore, the results presented in this study
should be taken as suggestive of disproportionately high adjustment costs in the Southern
European countries rather than as definitive evidence of this being the case. However, until
we get evidence based on firm level data from other European countries, this is the only
evidence available.29
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Table 1 - FDI Inward Stock per capita (current US Dollars)
1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
World 336 376 415 492 533 590 693
Western Europe 994 1034 1121 1410 1335 1556 1876
Southern Europe 784 1096 1179 1241 1129 1079 1331
CEE 29 53 76 138 181 269 326
   Czech Republic 102 259 343 573 685 923 1307
   Hungary 0 514 663 1165 1441 1588 1807
   Poland 8 78 114 203 297 425 561
   Russian Federation 9 16 27 44 98 91
Source: World Investment Report (1999)
Table 2a. The Number of Swedish MNEs with Activities in Different European Regions
1990-1998
Sweden CEE Western Europe Southern Europe
1990 120 - 109 21
1994 132 23 98 21
1998 117 32 73 11
Source: IUI database
Note: - data supressed.
Table 2b. Sales by Swedish MNEs in Different European Regions 1990-1998










1990 355 55 0 0 271 42 17 3
1994 380 59 4 1 251 39 11 2
1998 524 68 8 1 233 30 8 1
Source: IUI database
Table 2c. Employment by Swedish MNEs in Different European Regions 1990-1998
Sweden CEE Western Europe Southern Europe
1000’s percent 1000’s percent 1000’s percent 1000’s percent
1990 339 54 1 0 292 42 20 3
1994 245 60 10 3 140 35 11 3
1998 226 64 16 5 105 30 6 2
Source: IUI database33





Total wage costs per employee (1000’ SEK) 311 40 334 214
Value added per employee (1000’ SEK) 476 78 538 400
Wage ratio white collar/blue collar workers 1.69 2.12 1.62 1.99
Employment ratio white collar/blue collar workers 0.65 0.29 0.48 0.21
R&D expenditures (share of total sales) 0.072 0.006 0.010 0.007
Affiliate exports (share of total sales) - 0.48 0.38 0.40
Affiliate exports to Sweden (share of total sales) - 0.04 0.12 0.04
Affiliate imports from Swedish parent (share of total sales) - 0.16 0.13 0.03
Affiliate imports of intermediates from Swedish parent
(share of total sales)
- 0.16 0.10 0.02
Source: IUI database34










































Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Asterisk indicates that differences in means are significant at
the 10 percent level.
Table 5. Decomposition of Changes in the CEE region’s Share of Affiliate Employment
Sample Period ES D Within Between Net Entry
Low-wage Europe 1990-1994 0.53 0.33 (0.62) 0.26 (0.50) -0.06 (-0.11)
1994-1998 0.22 0.05 (0.25) 0.34 (1.55) -0.17 (-0.80)
Europe 1990-1994 0.10 0.04 (0.39) 0.07 (0.66) -0.01 (-0.05)
1994-1998 0.07 0.03 (0.35) 0.08 (1.09) -0.03 (-0.44)
Source: IUI database
Note: Figures in parentheses show the shares of the total change in ES that can be attributed to the different
components.35
Table 6. Results for Central and Eastern Europe. Heckman estimations
Dep var: P(A)
Selection model
Coefficient      Elasticity
Selection model
WE
Coefficient             Elasticity
Selection model
SE




































































lambda 0.42 1.93 2.45*
Log likelihood -222 -220 -205
Observations:
Total 241 241 241
Censored 188 188 188
Note: Figures within parentheses are t-statistics and asterisks denote level of significance: * (10%), ** (5%) and
*** (1%). Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering around the firm’s identity. Elasticities have been
computed at the means of the independent variables.36
Table 7. Results for Southern Europe. Heckman estimations
Dep var: P(A)
Selection model
Coefficient             Elasticity
Selection model
Coefficient             Elasticity
Selection model
Coefficient             Elasticity
Selection model






























































































lambda -1.70** 1.39 1.76*** -2.44*
Log likelihood -251 -249 -248 -245
Observations:
total 374 374 374 374
censored 315 315 315 315
Note: Figures within parentheses are t-statistics and asterisks denote level of significance: * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%). Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering
around the firm’s identity. Elasticities have been computed at the means of the independent variables.37
Table 8. Results for Western Europe. Heckman estimations
Dep var: P(A)
Selection model
Coefficient             Elasticity
Selection model
Coefficient             Elasticity
Selection model
Coefficient             Elasticity
Selection model






























































































lambda -1.44*** 0.97 1.18 -1.83***
Log likelihood -1495 -1495 -1493 -1487
Observations:
total 1287 1287 1287 1287
uncensored 887 887 887 887
Note: Figures within parentheses are t-statistics and asterisks denote level of significance: * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%). Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering
around the firm’s identity. Elasticities have been computed at the means of the independent variables.